

THE PUBLIC SAFETY CONCEPT IN THE CITY OF KALAMAZOO:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

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A Project Paper
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
In partial fulfillment for the
Degree of Master of Public Administration
School of Public Affairs and Administration

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
April, 1999

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Western Michigan University, 1999

In 1983, the city of Kalamazoo implemented what is called a Public Safety system. This system is where the police and fire departments are consolidated into one department. The main reasons that the city manager at that time and the Public Safety Committee said this should take place was a) an attempt save money by reducing the total number of employees, b) taking the fire station assigned firefighters and cross-training them as police officers and leaving just one or two personnel on each fire truck, thus taking the so called "non-productive" employees and assigning them as patrol officers and increasing the number of officers on the street, and c) placing a public safety station in every neighborhood, which was to include adding two new stations on the city's west and southwest side and reducing response times and increasing police visibility.

As you will see though, the public safety program as proposed was never implemented. Cuts were being made long before the department even came close to meeting the proposal. Costs of public safety have soared and are a bigger share of the city's general fund revenue now than they ever were, even with the major cuts that were made.

The focus of my research is on the costs associated with the sworn personnel and the overall performance of the public safety concept as it stands today.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1981, the Kalamazoo City Commission had established a committee to look into the feasibility and possible consolidation of police and fire services. This idea was first proposed by then City Manager Robert Bobb in 1977. For several years there was talk about the concept, but there did not seem to be much interest at that point. Finally, in 1980, things began to move towards more serious discussion of this concept.

After an extensive research process which entailed traveling to several cities in the U.S. which had the public safety concept, the Public Safety Committee developed a public safety program to meet Kalamazoo's needs. The concept was approved, and after numerous public hearings and public concern, the proposal was accepted by the City Commission.

The next step was to work out the details of implementation between the numerous labor unions affected, with the unions then having to vote to accept to change to public safety. This was accomplished, and in 1982 the city began to phase in the program. By 1986, the departments were fully consolidated into one, with core groups of police officers and firefighters not wishing to cross-train as they were offered this option. Those people either remained in their classification or were demoted.

The new department that was proposed by the committee was quite impressive. The goal was to have a public safety station in every neighborhood. This was a key selling point to the public. In 1987 when I was hired, the department was operating out of 8 stations, with 8 engine companies, 2 truck companies and a heavy rescue squad in service. There were also always at least 17 or 18 PSO's on the street plus 7 sergeants.

This was still way short of the proposed 32 total officers on the street 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This began to dwindle shortly after I started with the department. Stations were closed, apparatus was taken out of service, equipment operator positions were eliminated, and no ninth station was ever built.

Plain and simply, the program was never implemented as it was proposed. The public was sold down the river.

Today the program is below bare bones. Staffing on the street is always at minimum. Staffing of apparatus is inadequate. Training is non-existent. Morale is always low. So the ultimate question is what really happened to the proposed public safety department? And if public safety is the answer to every municipalities fiscal problems in providing police and fire services, why aren't they fleeing in droves to this concept?

The real issue is that it is time for the City of Kalamazoo to re-examine the situation, and perhaps look at saving costs and going back to separate police and fire departments. Two of the major departments that Kalamazoo patterned its program after, Winston-Salem and Durham, North Carolina, went back to separate departments shortly after Kalamazoo merged its departments. Obviously there is a lesson to be learned here.

Consolidation only has a chance to work in newly developed urban or suburban areas where the crime and fire rate is low. This is the reason that the program is successful in Sunnyvale, California. They have had the public safety concept since 1950, when their population was only 9800. Today their population is over 135,000. They have had the opportunity to "grow" into the program. Kalamazoo as a city is much too old, with too much crime and too many fires for the concept to work.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to give special thanks to several people who provided me with insightful information about the public safety concept. Deputy Chief Bill Bibby of the Durham, NC Fire Department and Chief John Gist of the Winston-Salem, NC Fire Department. Both of these fine gentlemen were willing to be frank in their experience with public safety and provide me crucial information as to the failure of public safety in their respective cities.

Also special thanks to my colleague and Past-President of the IAFF(International Association of Fire Fighters) Walter Culver. He was willing to assist me in giving the historical review of public safety and its implementation in the City of Kalamazoo.

And lastly thanks to all of the people I work closely with at the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety and the Texas Township Fire Department who have had to endure the time while I concentrate on writing my project paper.

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INTRODUCTION

Historical Background of Public Safety in Kalamazoo

In 1977, then City Manager Robert Bobb introduced the concept of Public Safety to the city commission and the public. At that time there was discussion but no genuine pursuit of seriously looking into the concept. Finally in December of 1980 the City Commission approved the formation of a committee to look into the concept and conduct a feasibility study of consolidating police and fire services. The Committee consisted of 14 people including the Mayor, several city commissioners, the Police Chief, the Fire Chief, several citizens, and the remainder were representatives of the various unions affected. The reason for studying the consolidation was based on two main reasons. Those reasons were: (1) a 1980 Citizens and Business survey conducted by the Western Michigan University Center for Sociological Research which stated that crime prevention and fire protection were the two highest priorities in the City of Kalamazoo, and (2) the cost of police and fire services had been increasing drastically in relation to the general fund budget and local property tax revenue collected.

The Committee stated that based on a 1975 report issued by the Citizen's Research Council of Michigan that the reasons for cities moving more and more towards the public safety concept are the rapidly escalating salary and benefit costs for both police officers and firefighters. The Report also stated that by consolidating services communities will be able to increase police patrol strength and firefighting

response with "little or no increase in cost" or to reduce expenditures for those services through salaries and benefits while "maintaining existing service levels".

The same Report stated that consolidation of police and fire services "can increase the number of on-duty staff available for police patrol or response to fire alarms by as much as 50 percent".

At the time of the Committee's research, the Michigan Municipal League data showed that there were only 21 communities in Michigan that had some form of consolidation, and most of them were smaller than Kalamazoo.

The Committee proceeded to examine public safety by looking at systems in Oak Park, Michigan, which had a population of about 36,000 and had full consolidation of services for 26 years. Peoria, Illinois with a population of 123,000 and which had returned to separate departments because of problems they stated they had with planning, labor relations and layoffs. Durham, North Carolina with a population of 105,000 and which had full consolidation since 1970. Winston-Salem, North Carolina with a population of 144,000 and which utilized a selective form of consolidation in 10 of 15 districts. The last one was Sunnyvale, California, with a population of 105,000 and which used the full consolidation form. At this time Kalamazoo's population was about 80,000.

Table-1 below shows the comparative data between the listed cities and fire and rescue calls and Part I crimes in relation to population.

	Kalamazoo	Sunnyvale	Winston-Salem	Durham
Fire Calls	2254	1475	4064	2452
Rescue Calls	2930	2460	1079	2492
Total	5184	3935	5143	4944
Part I Crimes	9365	6776	13,029	10,568
Population	80,000	105,000	144,000	105,000
Total Fire/Rescue calls per 1000 pop.	64.8	37.48	35.72	47.09
Total Part I crimes per 1000 pop.	117.06	64.53	90.48	100.65

As you can see from the data, crime and fire/rescue calls were much higher in Kalamazoo, specifically when examined per 1000 population, than they were at that time in Sunnyvale, Winston-Salem and Durham. This is a significant factor which will be discussed later.

After much research the Committee developed a public safety system for Kalamazoo. The Committee had considered several issues in the design of the system: (1) the "level of police and fire service 'should' remain the same or be 'increased' under a successful system", (2) future costs under public safety "should decrease or remain the same as a percentage of the general fund budget", (3) through attrition no one should get laid off, (4) training of public safety officers(PSO's) is critical, (5) the police and fire dispatching will be centralized, and (6) public hearings should be held to discuss the consolidation.

The Public Safety Committee repeatedly states throughout the proposal that costs will remain the same for a consolidated department or will be reduced slightly. One of the selling points of the program was that there would be huge savings by merging departments. This would be accomplished by reducing the total number of

positions from 383 between both departments to 344 positions. There would be 291 sworn officers and 53 civilian employees.

Also repeatedly throughout the proposal one of the "key" issues that is identified is training. For the program to succeed officers must be well trained and training should be conducted frequently to keep officers well trained, specifically in firefighting skills, as fires do not occur often enough to maintain their skills. Training of the 12-hour shift officers would occur every duty day for at least 2 hours per shift. This would be the result of having more officers on the street which would allow for "slack time" and training then could be accomplished for both police skills and fire skills.

The Public Safety Committee identified 19 advantages of consolidating police and fire services. Those advantages were supposed to be:

1. Increased Patrol Strength and Reduced Costs - theoretically public safety was supposed to increase the number of officers on street patrol by 50%. They state that in order to accomplish this in the police department it would require hiring an additional 48 police officers which would have cost \$1.2 million at that time.
2. Reduced Work Week - they stated that the work week would be reduced for about 100 firefighters from a 56 hour week to 42 hours. To accomplish the staffing level of a public safety system in maintaining a separate fire department would require hiring an additional 33 firefighters for a cost of \$825,000.

3. Emergency Recall – this would provide for more off-duty personnel that could recalled in the event of a major emergency.
4. Public Safety Stations – the proposal will establish 9 precinct stations which will provide improved service to all neighborhoods and would allow easy access for citizens.
5. Availability of Public Safety Personnel – the total number of personnel is reduced while the number of personnel available for police and fire services remains the same.
6. Administration – the proposal eliminates personnel in areas of dispatching, records, purchasing, training and budgetary and financial monitoring activities.
7. Authority – establishes a single line of command and provides for better cooperation between both services.
8. Police-Community Relations – by having more officers on the street they will get to know the citizens better and perform security checks.
9. Increased Morale – public safety offers more interesting and challenging employment with improved salaries.
10. Efficiency – PSO's would reach the scene before fire apparatus and put out fires with their extinguishers.
11. Patrol Fatigue – in a normal police department training is usually done on an overtime basis. With the increase of patrol strength under public safety,

training would be accomplished during the shift, which would "break up" the long shift and eliminate fatigue.

12. Future Public Safety Stations – stations that would be built would be smaller because there would be only one or two station assigned PSO's thus cutting the cost of construction in half.
13. Arson – one unit would now handle this rather than separate fire marshals and a detective.
14. Improved Productivity – provides for more efficient utilization of personnel. Consolidation would eliminate firefighters and them having a lot of "down time" spent in the stations. More people would be on patrol.
15. Consolidated Dispatch – dispatching would now be done at one location rather than separate police and fire dispatchers.
16. Team Concept – team firefighting and police work would be strengthened. Street PSO's and station PSO's would work out of their assigned stations and would work closely together and train together.
17. Crime Prevention – with more officers on the street patrolling this will reduce the amount of crime.
18. Fire Prevention and Fire Training – by being on the street and patrolling the PSO's will learn their streets, hydrant locations and hazardous buildings.
19. False Fire Alarms and Special Fire Services – since a large number of fire

calls are false alarms, street PSO's would arrive first and be able to cancel the fire apparatus.

These are the main issues that the Public Safety Committee has identified that will improve by consolidation. Most of these issues will be addressed later as to the success of the each.

The focus of this paper will be on the "operations" part of the Public Safety Department. It would require much more time to dissect each Division of the department and each position, however I will elude to certain parts of the department outside of the operations part.

Forms of Consolidation

There are various forms of consolidating police and fire services. Managing Fire Services(1988), a book published by the International Association of City Managers, identifies five forms: (1) Full Consolidation – this form is the one that Kalamazoo chose and it is the one in which all personnel are cross-trained to perform police and fire duties, (2) Partial Consolidation – this form is one in which each department retains its own identity, but a select group of people that are assigned to patrol are actually cross-trained, (3) Selected Area Consolidation – this is similar to partial consolidation, but the difference is that the group that is cross-trained is assigned to selected geographic areas, (4) Functional Consolidation – in this form separate departments are retained, but police officers are trained to do certain fire functions like assisting in hydrant hook ups and firefighters help with certain

administrative tasks, and (5) Nominal or Administrative Consolidation – here the departments remain separate also, but they function under one person which would be the public safety director.

Proponents of public safety identify the following as reasons for consolidation: (1) firefighter “downtime” can be better used for police patrol, (2) will significantly increase the number of on-duty personnel for police patrol and fire suppression, (3) certain costs can be reduced such as administrative functions and dispatching.

Opponents of public safety identify the following reasons for not consolidating: (1) firefighters when not responding on calls are typically performing other duties such as fire inspections, station duties, equipment and apparatus maintenance and training, (2) when fire apparatus arrive to a scene with a skeleton crew, they are met there by patrol personnel and it takes a long time to assemble, (3) patrol personnel are often delayed arriving because of being tied up on a police call, arrest or they are far away from the scene, (4) training is not adequate for PSO’s to maintain their skills in both fire suppression and police duties, and (5) a major fire can leave the community with no police protection, while a major police emergency will leave the community with inadequate fire protection.

According the Managing Fire Services, there are less than 200 communities across the U.S. that have some for of police-fire consolidation. Most of those, about 75%, are in communities with populations less than 25,000. About 50% are in communities with populations less than 10,000. Only about 25% were fully

consolidated and 60% had functional or nominal consolidation. The largest fully consolidated department is Sunnyvale, California, which today serves a population of 135,000 covering 24 square miles.

In 1972, under the direction of President Nixon, a commission was established to examine the fire problem in the U.S. The commission, called The National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control, published a report in 1973 called America Burning. This report scrutinized the fire service intensely. The report addresses the public safety concept. At that time, only 23 communities had some form of police-fire consolidation. Of those, 17 had populations of less than 10,000 and "generally they are affluent communities, lacking the hazards associated with aging urban centers or large industrial districts....they do not have the crime problems of urban areas; hence, the absence of patrolmen during a fire is less risky than it would be in larger cities". It also states that "consolidation appears to work in areas where neither the crime problem nor the fire problem is serious....as either problem arises in seriousness, so does the potential for conflict of purposes". The result then would be that one service would be sacrificed for the sake of the other service.

The report also states that firefighting and police work require very different skills. Both professions are for people with different motivations and different assessments of risks they are willing to take.

Another point brought out by the report is that while consolidation takes advantage of the firefighters' downtime, there are important functions that firefighters

need to be carrying out, such as fire prevention inspections, fire safety education and paramedic and rescue services.

PRE-PUBLIC SAFETY

The Kalamazoo Fire Department

Overview of the Department

Prior to the consolidation of police and fire services the fire department was really quite a simple organization. The department consisted of a total of 164 employees. Of that total 153 were actually involved in fire suppression duties. Each of these personnel worked the 56-hour work week assigned to one of three 24-hour shifts. The 153 positions consisted of the following:

- 3 Assistant Chiefs
- 12 Captains
- 18 Lieutenants
- 36 Equipment Operators
- 72 Firefighters
- 12 Paramedic Firefighters

153 Total

The remainder of the 11 positions consisted of the following:

- 1 Fire Chief
- 2 Fire Marshals
- 1 Paramedic Lieutenant
- 1 Training Lieutenant
- 1 Administrative Assistant
- 1 Secretary
- 4 Dispatchers

11 Total

The fire department operated out of 7 fire stations located throughout the city. There were a total of 8-engine companies, 2-ladder truck companies, 1- heavy rescue squad, and 1-paramedic rescue unit.

Station #1 was located downtown on Cedar at Burdick(the current training station) and was staffed by 2-engine companies and 1-rescue squad with 4 personnel assigned to each. Also at Station #1 was the Paramedic Rescue Unit with 2 paramedics assigned to it. The Assistant Chief was also assigned there. A total of 14 fire personnel per shift were assigned to Station #1(not including the Assistant Chief).

Station #2 on Bryant Street at James was staffed by 1-engine company with 4 fire personnel per shift.

Station #3 on Gull Road at Riverview was staffed by 1-engine company and 4 fire personnel per shift.

Station #4 on North Rose Street at Norway was staffed by 1-engine company and 1-ladder truck company each staffed by 4 personnel for a total of 8 fire personnel per shift.

Station #5 on Douglas Avenue at West North Street was staffed by 1-engine company with 4 fire personnel per shift.

Station #6 on Howard at Oakland Drive was staffed by 1-engine company and 1-ladder truck company with 4 personnel assigned to each for a total of 8 fire personnel per shift.

Station #7 at the Airport was staffed by one engine company and 1-Airport Crash/Fire/Rescue truck with a total of 4 fire personnel per shift.

Cost of Operation

Table-2 below shows the cost of operating the fire department in the 7 years prior to the implementation of public safety.

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Budget in millions	\$2.5	\$2.7	\$3.7	\$3.7	\$4.5	\$4.5	\$5.5
General Fund Budget in millions	\$17.0	\$18.0	\$19.2	\$19.7	\$20.0	\$21.4	\$22.6
% of General Fund	14.7	15.0	19.2	18.7	22.5	21.0	24.3
% change from previous year	N/A	8.0	37.0 *ALS*	0.0	21.6	0.0	22.2

As you can see the fire department operating budget increased from 14.7% of the general fund budget in 1975 to 24.3% in 1981 for a total of 9.6% increase over the 7 year period. The 37% change in 1977 is attributed to the department implementing the Paramedic Advanced Life Support Unit(ALS). The cost to implement that was about \$700,000. The \$1.0 million increase in 1981 appears to be the implementation of a second Paramedic Unit.

Essentially the fire department was a pretty streamlined organization with 153 out of the 164 personnel involved in providing emergency medical services and fire suppression. Ancillary employees were non-existent, unlike the police department.

The Kalamazoo Police Department

Overview of the Department

Prior to the consolidation of police and fire services the police department had 219 employees. There were 80 officers assigned to street patrol and 11 sergeants. On any given day there were up to 25 patrol cars on the street, specifically during the busiest time of night which was between 10:30pm and 2:30am. Shifts overlapped so that coverage would be provided during the busiest hours. During the month of March 1981 the average street patrol strength was 11.7 officers. This number will become more important later when comparing data from pre-public safety and the current staffing.

The police department was divided into 2 divisions which were the Operations Division and Support Services Division. The Operations Division consisted of:

- 1 Deputy Chief
- 1 Captain
- 4 Lieutenants
- 11 Patrol Sergeants
- 1 Traffic Sergeant
- 1 Neighborhood Patrol Sergeant
- 9 Neighborhood Patrol Officers
- 9 Traffic Officers
- 80 Patrol Officers
- 1 Community Service Officer
- 3 Clerical

121 Total

The Criminal Investigations Bureau was a part of the Operations Division and it consisted of the following:

- 1 Captain
- 1 Lieutenant
- 3 Sergeants
- 2 Polygraph Examiners
- 15 Detectives
- 6 Special Investigations Officers
- 5 Youth Officers
- 2 Parity Officers
- 1 Community Service Officer
- 3 Clerical

39 Total

The Support Services Division which handled the crime lab, communications, records, accounting and purchasing duties consisted of the following:

- 1 Deputy Chief
- 1 Lieutenant
- 1 Sergeant
- 11 Clerical
- 1 Records Supervisor
- 5 Police Officers
- 6 Lab Technicians
- 1 Systems Analyst
- 1 Maintenance Worker
- 2 Community Service Officers
- 1 Lab Aide

32 Total

Cost of Operation

Table-3 below shows the cost of operating the police department in the 7 years prior to the implementation of public safety.

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Budget in millions	\$3.3	\$3.9	\$4.9	\$5.1	\$6.0	\$6.8	\$7.5
General Fund Budget in millions	\$17.0	\$18.0	\$19.2	\$19.7	\$20.0	\$21.4	\$22.6
% of General Fund	19.4	21.6	25.5	25.9	30.0	31.8	33.2
% change from previous year	N/A	18.2	25.6	4.0	17.6	13.3	10.3

The police department operating budget increased from 19.4% of the general fund budget in 1975 to 33.2% in 1981 for a total of 13.8% increase. It is not clear why there was a \$1.0 million increase from 1976 to 1977.

THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROPOSAL

What the Consolidated Department Was Supposed to Look Like

Facilities

The fire department operated out of 7 fire stations. The police department operated out of the police headquarters building downtown. The Public Safety Committee's "pitch" was that with public safety, officers would be assigned to the fire stations which would become police precincts and there would become a new sense of ownership by neighborhoods. There would be more police visibility because of this and also because of the additional officers on patrol.

Also proposed was a "station in every neighborhood" motto. As mentioned above, the fire department operated out of 7 stations. Under the new public safety department, there would be 2 new stations constructed in areas that are inadequately covered by fire response. One station would be built in the Drake Road and West Michigan area to service the WMU campus and new apartment and commercial developments in that area and as well as the so called "panhandle" area at West Main and Drake Road.

The second station to be built would be in the Oakwood area. This area had parts that had long response times from the Oakland and Howard station, and neighbors had been complaining about this for some time. This station was

constructed in 1983, in an apparent attempt to sell the public safety concept to that neighborhood.

The new department would then have 9 fire stations/police precincts providing excellent coverage of the entire city.

Staffing

Staffing would be increased significantly under the proposal(see Appendix A). With the addition of 2 new fire stations, apparatus strength would be brought up to a total of 10 engine companies from the current 8, ladder truck companies would remain the same with 2, rescue squad company would be the same with 1, and the paramedic units would remain the same at 2. Each apparatus would have 2 PSO/EO (Equipment Operators) assigned to it with the exception of engine companies 3, 5, 8 and 9. Those would be staffed with 1 PSO/EO. The paramedic units would continue to be staffed with 2 Paramedic/Firefighters.

Police staffing would be nearly doubled from existing levels. As mentioned earlier, the average shift strength was 11.7 officers. Under the proposal, street patrol strength would go up to a total of 32 officers on the street, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. This would include 24 PSO's, 7 Sergeants and 1 Lieutenant. The on duty strength of the patrol and suppression part of public safety would be 23 PSO/EO's and 31 Officers for a total of 54 personnel available for firefighting duties. This is only a net increase of 4 firefighting personnel per shift from the existing potential of 50 on each shift in the fire department. The shift street lieutenant would be the

equivalent of the assistant fire chief in the fire department, acting as the fireground commander.

There would then be a total of 69 PSO/Equipment Operators and 128 PSO's and Command Officers for all shifts for a total of 197 personnel assigned to the patrol and suppression force.

PUBLIC SAFETY TODAY

A Different Look from the Proposal

Facilities

The public safety department today looks nothing like what was "proposed" by the Public Safety Committee. The proposal called for 9 fire stations/police precincts. Today there are only 6 fire stations left. In 1987 the department received cost estimates for roof repair and other items to be repaired at Station #1 on Cedar Street. This cost estimate was around \$175,000. These repairs did not take place at that time.

In 1987, the city contracted with Carroll Buracker and Associates to conduct a study of the Public Safety Department. This study was a comprehensive study of the entire department. The study recommended a huge list of proposed changes. The department picked and chose whatever recommendations they wanted and implemented them. One of those changes was to close Station #1 and sell it. Some of this was in part due to the cost of the repairs, but a lot of it had to do with the study's recommendation. The study stated that it was not necessary to have a station in the downtown area, and recommended that the apparatus be distributed to other stations to replace old apparatus and the personnel there reassigned to other stations and increase the one person staffing of apparatus to two. The fire and rescue calls in the downtown area could be handled by the other stations and that response times are not that important. All fire suppression and patrol personnel were to be redistributed.

Station #1 was never sold as was proposed, and now is being used to house the training division, fire marshals, the Tactical Response Unit (TRU), and the storage of lost/found bicycles. An unknown amount of money was spent to remodel some areas of that station. This is a pure sign that fire suppression abilities in the downtown area, probably the most important area of the city and highest risk area, is not important. If the station was not going to be sold, apparatus should never have been moved out of there.

The department also chose to move out of the airport fire station (#7) and close operations there. Kalamazoo County assumed the airport firefighting function. Moving out of this station left the entire southeastern part of the city with inadequate fire protection.

The ninth fire station was never built, so now the city was and still is down to 6 fire stations. Response times by fire apparatus to the unprotected areas are very long, and PSO's that arrive on the scene prior to apparatus have limited ability as what they can actually do.

A proposal is in the works for the Public Safety Department to remodel and move into the Bronson Crosstown Center at Burdick and Crosstown, which is currently owned by Bronson Hospital. This facility would be used for Public Safety Headquarters and the District Courts.

Apparatus

The Public Safety Committee proposal called for 10 engine companies. One

engine company at each station plus an additional engine company downtown at Station #1 to handle the high call volume and fire load of the central downtown area.

Also 2 ladder truck companies(stations 4 and 6), 1 heavy rescue(station 1) and 2 paramedic units(station 1 and 2) were to be in service. The paramedic units were taken out of service in 1984 when advanced life support services were given to a sole-provider private ambulance service which was Mall City Ambulance. At that time the Kalamazoo County Medical Control Authority would only grant one provider the authority to provide ALS. Logically the department no longer needed the paramedic units. The department would continue to respond to rescue calls as a first responder agency under a layered system whereby the closest engine company would respond.

Today with all of the station closings and so forth the city has been relegated to 5 engine companies, half of what was proposed, 2 ladder truck companies and 1 squad company. This has put a tremendous amount of pressure on the remaining engine companies as far as fire/rescue call responses, and a tremendous amount of wear and tear on the apparatus. This is a significant factor which was not looked at when the decision to close stations and take engine companies out of service took place. Also not just the additional responses, but the tremendously long responses to those areas that are unprotected. PSO's arriving on the scene cannot "save the day" with an extinguisher in hand. Fire loss statistics show that losses remain pretty constant, so the alleged theory that PSO's arriving on the scene first with fire extinguishers are going to put out a lot of fires is a total falsehood.

Staffing

Obviously staffing is directly related to apparatus that are in service. With the original proposal calling for 10 engine companies, 2 ladder truck companies and 1 heavy rescue company, the staffing was supposed to be 23 PSO/EO's on duty each day. Today that has been relegated to 13 EO's on each shift. E/O's work on the 3 shift system, working 24 hour shifts, or 56 hour work weeks. Engine companies 3, 5, and 7 are staffed with only 1 EO. Engine companies 2 and 6 are staffed with 2 EO's. Ladder company 4 is staffed with 2 EO's, while ladder company 6 has 2 EO's assigned to it, but for some reason an agreement was made where 1 person could be assigned to this ladder truck during weekdays from 7AM to 7PM, and all day Saturday and Sunday, thus reducing apparatus staffing to 12, if there was an EO on time off and no extra patrol PSO's to back fill and be assigned to the ladder truck. This is very alarming, as this brand new piece of equipment cost \$600,000, is very large, takes great expertise to drive and operate, and should never have less than 2 EO's assigned to it. In Mittendorf (1998), Truck Company Operations, he clearly states that the minimum number of personnel that should be assigned to a ladder truck company is 4 personnel, with the optimum being 6 personnel. Truck company operations at a fire scene are a vital piece to the firefighting puzzle. Ladder company 6 is no exception. It takes a minimum of 3 personnel to fully operate it, which includes 1 person at the pump panel, 1 person at the turntable who serves as eyes and ears to the person in the platform, and 1 person in the platform itself. In a large rescue operation it would take 2 personnel in the platform. Firefighting is always

done in teams of 2, so with the 4 person minimum, you could accomplish several tasks at the same time, aside from the aerial operation itself. Truck company work involves putting up ladders to buildings for emergency egress for personnel inside, ventilating the building, performing salvage and overhaul, shutting off utilities, and firefighting itself. In most fire departments, truck company personnel have pre-designated assignments upon arrival of to a fire.

The theory by administration and management is that anyone can operate the ladder trucks or tele-squirts. They feel that street PSO's can be assigned to the ladder truck and handle the truck company operations. This is not a possibility, as street PSO's have no contact with the ladder trucks, and only those PSO's assigned to the stations that have ladder trucks are vaguely familiar with the trucks themselves. Personnel operating these trucks have to be extremely proficient, because they are dangerous pieces of equipment, and improper setup or operation can be disastrous. It is also impossible to have 92 street PSO's trained proficiently in ladder truck operations. This is a crucial issue, because of the multitude of PSO's that could be at any one given fire scene. You cannot assign PSO's to the ladder truck, as their availability is not guaranteed.

The total fire suppression personnel available on apparatus on any given shift is 12/13.

The number of street patrol PSO's assigned varies from 14 to 20 depending on the number of PSO's assigned to each of the 4 platoons. Street PSO's work 12 hour

shifts, on either the 7AM to 7PM shift or the 7PM to 7AM shift. There are 4 platoons assigned to each shift, with 2 platoons always working.

Minimum staffing on the street by labor agreement is 14 PSO's. The only exception is weeknights, when staffing can drop to 13 from 4AM to 7AM, and on weekends, when only 1 downtown beat officer is needed, and the extra beat person can be assigned to the street. Generally speaking, it is a rare occasion when street staffing is above the minimum.

Command officer street strength is a maximum of 7 sergeants, with the minimum of 5 by labor agreement. The same applies for command officers as for PSO's, and that is that they are usually only at minimum staffing.

So the total street patrol strength then is usually 19, with a rare occasion when there are extra PSO's or command officers. If there are extras, more often than not they are back-filling either the jail, tele-serve, court officer, dispatch or assigned to a fire apparatus.

Therefore, the total firefighting strength is usually around 32, and rarely more. The original public safety proposal as you recall provides for 32 street officers plus 23 fire personnel on apparatus 24 hours a day and 7 days a week for a total of 55 possible suppression personnel. This brings it to 23 fire personnel less than proposed.

The remainder of positions within the department remains relatively stable, with some positions being shifted around and the addition of several positions to the Neighborhood Liaison Officer program, the Kalamazoo Valley Enforcement Team(KVET), and the establishment of the TRU unit in 1990.

All of these units have been added to numerous times over the past 12 years. KDPS provides the majority of the manpower to staff the KVET unit, with 12 officers assigned to the unit. The other departments within the county provide 2, 1 or even no help to KVET. The NLO program has now been expanded to 12 positions, with most neighborhoods assigned 2 officers.

DATA ANALYSIS

Selected Data Analysis

Wage Comparisons

Appendix B shows the wages of firefighters and police officers from 14 selected communities across Michigan and the Kalamazoo County Sheriffs Department. As you can see, the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety starting PSO salary is \$40,448. The average starting salary in Michigan for firefighters is \$30,606. This represents a starting salary 32% higher than the state average. The average starting salary for a police officer is \$32,626. This represents a 24% higher salary for public safety than the state average.

The top salary for a PSO after 6 years in 1999 is \$54,775. The state average top pay for a firefighter is \$44,824. This represents a 22% higher salary than the state average. The average top pay for a police officer is \$46,371. This represents an 18% higher top wage than the state average.

Some say that the higher wages are a way to entice people to come work for public safety and to recruit quality people. This may be true for a few people, but when you examine the situation more closely, you will see that the high majority of criminal justice students want to work for a "true" police department, and have no interest or desire to fight fires. If the public safety system is so great, you should not have to use money as a way to recruit and entice people to come work for you.

Police Calls for Service

In comparing the surrounding police departments around Kalamazoo, you can see that there is not much difference in calls per patrol officer.

In Kalamazoo, the average yearly calls for service has been steady over the past 10 years right at 80,000. You can break this down simplistically by total calls per patrol officer, which in Kalamazoo's case is right around 90 street PSO's, with the average call per officer/per shift around 2.4 calls.

In Portage the total calls for service in 1998 was 19,524. Portage has a total of 30 patrol officers. This equates to about 1.8 calls per officer/per shift.

In Kalamazoo County, the sheriffs department had a total of 31,823 calls for service in 1998. The sheriffs department has 37 deputies assigned to road patrol. This equates to 2.4 calls per deputy/per shift.

Two things to note here are (1) Kalamazoo Public Safety makes a case number for each charge in multiple charge situations, whereas Portage and the County do not. Those departments use one case number when one person is being charged with multiple charges. This skews the call per officer statistic, which will show that Public Safety Officers handle more calls.

The same would apply for arrest statistics. KDPS used to fill out one arrest sheet per arrestee and list the additional arrests on the same sheet. It wasn't until 1992 when the policy was changed to make an arrest sheet for each individual arrest charge. This skews the arrest statistics, which makes it look like more people were

arrested, when in actuality the numbers for physical arrests remained the same, just the number of charges showed an increase.

Staffing

Appendix C shows the number of sworn personnel for Kalamazoo Public Safety, where they are assigned, and their respective wages. The wages are strictly base wages and do not include any overtime.

As you can see, the total wages and benefits for all sworn officers is approximately \$19,599,653, and of that wages alone total \$14,518,261. Benefits are calculated on the rule of thumb that they are 35% of wages. The department budget reflects a much lower percentage and appears to average 25% between all of the divisions. The total department budget for 1999 is \$24,215,653. The wages do not include dispatchers or other ancillary people that work at the department.

If you wanted to get a simplistic idea of how much separate police and fire departments would cost, assuming the existing public safety department was divided proportionally, you can just subtract 10% from the wage and benefit total, excluding the firefighters in the IAFF union. All others received a 10% wage increase above the police salary for cross-training in 1983. The total wages and benefits would be \$18,997,232 – 10% or \$1,899,723 which would be \$17,097,509. This would about equal the total wages and benefits that are calculated for separate departments in Appendix D and E.

CONCLUSIONS

Summary

Why Consolidation Occurred

After extensively examining the Public Safety Committees Report on Consolidating Police and Fire Services, it becomes quite evident what the real issue was.

While obviously costs for both services were rising, it appears that the main focus of the merger was to latch onto the fire department and have it subsidize the police department. This could be done by consolidating the departments. You can see from Tables 2 and 3, where the rate at which the police department budget was escalating was far outpacing the fire department. In 1975, the actual difference in dollars between the police and fire department was \$800,000 in favor of the police department. Obviously because the police department had 55 more employees than the fire department. By 1980, the difference in dollars had escalated to \$2,300,000. This was a huge difference now, but with no real explanation that could be found. Clearly the cost of police services was rising rapidly, and what a better way to get more revenue than to latch onto the fire department and its \$5.5 million budget.

Throughout the report there is constant reference to firefighter "downtime". One would be of the opinion that they were politely stating that firefighters do not do anything and are basically lazy. Firefighters by nature are one the hardest working group of people there is.

Problems with the Public Safety Concept

There are numerous problems with the public safety concept which were either ignored at the time of the merger or overlooked.

The biggest problem is identified as training. In a normal fire department training is conducted on a daily basis. The Kalamazoo Fire Department was no different. At least 2 hours a day were dedicated to training. Firefighter training is crucial because you simply do not get enough fires to stay proficient. Training was identified as important by the Committee, and the proposal was to have 32 patrol cars on the street 24 hours a day 7 days a week. This never came to fruition as administrators were making cuts and changes to the proposal before it was even implemented.

By having 32 cars on the street, it would have allowed all personnel time during their shift to train. The committee said that each patrol PSO would be ensured of at least 2 hours of training per shift. This has never occurred. A major reason is that there simply are not enough PSO's on the street to allow time for training. Fire training would require calling out of service and therefore units would not be able to respond to calls for service. The problem now is that there are not enough cars on the street, and when an attempt to train is made, dispatchers are usually screaming for units to respond to emergency calls.

Training for station assigned personnel is impossible also. A one-person engine company cannot get out and train. You need at least 5 or 6 people to

accomplish anything and have useful training. Generally speaking station assigned personnel are not as in need for fire training as street assigned PSO's.

The training issue is not the fault of any one individual or the training division. The problem is simply with the system. It does not allow for any kind of training, mostly because of time. Currently no fire training is received.

This is supported by what happened in the public safety departments in Durham, North Carolina and Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Both were fully consolidated departments long before Kalamazoo decided to consolidate. Kalamazoo actually patterned its program after the one in Durham. Durham went back to separate police and fire departments in 1985, two years after Kalamazoo began consolidating. Winston-Salem went back to separate departments in 1988. Both identified the following as major areas of concern and problems: (1) a genuine neglect of the fire service, (2) no time for training and no time to set aside for training, (3) a "lets get police work done" mentality, (4) falsification of reports, specifically training reports, documenting training that never occurred, and inability to meet OSHA standards (5) personnel tired and burned out, (6) major fire occurrences where all of patrol was stripped, (7) a hostage situation which tied up patrol and no one to respond to fires, and (8) they could not figure out how to conduct training since it was impossible to pull people from the street.

Another part of the training issue is PSO attitude. PSO's are hired from colleges and universities with law enforcement degrees, and are even told at recruitment time not to worry about the firefighting part of the job because you do not

have to do it but once in a while, but they utilize a "look at the money you are going to make" type of pitch. Simply stated people come to work for Kalamazoo Public Safety for the police work and just put up with the firefighting because they have to.

This is emphasized in the TriData Corporation consultant report released in 1997. The report states "the relatively small number of fire responses in comparison to police calls leads to the possibility of a defacto specialization in police services. Attitudinally, and by assessment of the organizational chart, the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety appears to emphasize the provision of police services. While an emphasis on the type of services that constitute the majority of the service demand is reasonable, the potential for loss of life and economic loss associated with fires should make any bias toward one service a cause for concern. Assuming that a public safety department must compromise slightly in the delivery of either police or fire services, it is apparent that Kalamazoo compromised in its commitment to the fire services".

I eluded to this earlier when I discussed the number of personnel that were supposed to have been assigned to apparatus and the street compared to what it is now, which is about two-fifths less.

This is again supported by TriData's report where they state "there is no doubt that dedicated equipment operator staffing for fire service is at a minimal level and can not tolerate any reduction. A key concern is that in the event of a structure fire, the number of personnel responding is less than would be assembled under a traditional separate fire department".

Part of the staffing problem is that although there appears to be close to the same number of sworn personnel as was proposed, numerous officers have been shifted to new units or added to other units with total disregard for the fire suppression part of the department.

The TriData report also alludes to on scene staffing. They state "there are two key concerns with the firefighting capability of the KDPS. First is the time that it takes to assemble a firefighting crew for an incident, and the second is the ability of the on-duty staffing to handle a large or simultaneous fire". This is a very accurate statement. Having worked in separate fire and police departments, I am quite familiar what it takes to get the job done in both fields. It takes a much longer time to start fire attack under public safety than it does when you have a 4 or 5 person crew riding on an engine together who work with each other day in and day out and understand what each one is exactly supposed to do. This alleged concept of teamwork that public safety was supposed to bring about is non-existent. You wind up working with so many different people because of all the varying shifts that there is never any continuity. A lot of disorganization occurs on the fireground.

Also on a first alarm assignment you get 2 engine companies, 1 ladder company and 1 squad truck for a total of 6 or 7 equipment operators, 5 or 6 PSO's and 2 sergeants for a total of 15 maximum. These personnel are used up quickly. At least 2-4 are needed for search and rescue, 2 for fire suppression, 2 for a back up line, 2 for Rapid Intervention, 2 to 5 operating equipment, 1 commanding the incident and the remainder performing ventilation.

The TriData report states that "because simultaneous fires would be fought by on-duty staff, both the police and fire capabilities of the KDPS would be severely taxed". The report further states that "over the years, as crime increased, more personnel were taken from the patrol function and placed into specialized units, thereby reducing the on-duty strength further". This is where the problem lies. Street strength has been stripped from what it was supposed to be.

The report also alludes to the fact that what was promised in the consolidation never took place. They agree with the fact that instead of implementing the department as proposed, the department has gone backwards. They state that they have "serious reservations about the level of fire services provided" and summarized the department as follows: "KDPS is primarily a police department that, on occasion, fights fires".

It is a well-known fact that firefighting is labor intensive and requires maximum supervision. The fire service is a reactive organization. It is only proactive in the sense of fire prevention and education. The firefighters' time, aside from normal duties, is to be in the state of readiness. This has been called "non-productive time" or "unproductive". This is a total fallacy, as firefighting has become an extremely technical occupation, especially in the last twenty years. More burdens have been shifted to and placed upon the fire service such as hazardous materials incident mitigation, confined space rescue and other technical rescue situations, EMS training and recertification, defibrillator training and recertification, and CPR recertification. The demand for training is extreme, and this is what needs to occur

during the course of a firefighter's shift. This currently is not done and virtually cannot be done because of the system.

Another problem with public safety is that there are no promotional opportunities or areas of specialty for someone who prefers to do things like that in the fire service side of the program. Everything is police driven. The only thing you could call a specialty is the Equipment Operator classification. These are the people that are assigned to drive or ride apparatus at the stations. This particular assignment is looked very negatively upon by supervisors, management and administration. These positions appear to be just a thorn in their side, and if there was a way for them to eliminate all of these positions, they certainly would. However, these positions are critical, as the competency of EO's is crucial at fire scenes, because the lives of the firefighters going interior to fight fire rest in the EO's hands.

Fatigue is another factor. If a fire comes in at the beginning of the shift, PSO's are usually spent for the remainder of the shift. This then becomes a safety issue, especially when PSO's have to deal with criminals and could lose their edge after fighting a fire. I recall numerous times where we had structure fires at the beginning of the shift, and then you are tired for the remainder of the shift, to the point that by 1AM or 2AM you cannot even see straight anymore. This is tremendously hazardous to the officers and citizens alike. Reduced performance results in reduced quality of service.

Another problem is that public safety hires only people from law enforcement or criminal justice programs. It does not appear that they have or do recruit people

from the fire science programs to get a better diversity of people. This fact is confirmed by officers who have been on recruiting trips, where targeted recruits are told to look at how much money they will make doing police work, and not to worry about fighting fires, as they will not have to do that often and it is only 5-10% of their job. This is a huge factor after people are hired, as all they truly care about is the police work, and some are downright scared and dislike firefighting.

Poor long range planning is another problem. Issues that deal with apparatus, equipment and facilities seem to get left on the backburner. An example of this is apparatus replacement. A strict schedule should be set up and followed to get apparatus replaced in a timely fashion, so you do not wind up buying three trucks at the same time for \$1.2 million as happened two years ago.

Lack of camaraderie and teamwork, specifically during firefighting, and lack of aggressiveness when fighting fires. Numerous PSO's are tentative in fighting fire, as they do not feel comfortable with it, and try to avoid it if at all possible, because their heart truly lies in police work. PSO's have the general feeling that the firefighting effort of the department is good. Quite honestly they have nothing to base the quality of firefighting on, as they have never worked for traditional fire departments, so they have nothing to compare it to and make a legitimate evaluation. If they had the opportunity to see a traditional fire department in action, they would see the lack of quality that public safety provides.

Lastly is the combined administration of the department. It is quite apparent that the "beast" is too big for one person to handle. The department is large and

complex, and just too much for one person to manage. There are too many things happening on a daily basis, specifically police related matters, and they become too removed from the heart and soul of the department, which is the operations division.

Administrators, management and supervisors will never admit that the program is failing or unsuccessful, for the mere notion that if the departments were to separate, they would lose money, and then take decreases in their current exorbitant salaries.

What should have occurred

There was an obvious push to get public safety through by the city manager and the police chief. What should have occurred is that both the police and fire departments should have been scrutinized and as a minimum streamlined to become more efficient.

Quite honestly the fire department was already very lean, and the city would have saved over \$1.5 million anyway when advanced life support was turned over to private enterprise. That would have been a significant budget reduction and would have helped the city when financial times were tight.

The police department on the other hand had room for some streamlining. There were way too many "upper" command officers. The service division was overloaded with too many police officers, sergeants and lieutenants. Many positions could have been eliminated or reassigned to patrol.

The patrol function was well covered. There were 80 patrol officers, 9 traffic officers, 11 patrol sergeants and 1 traffic sergeant for a total of 101. Today there are only 120 total, a net result of 19 more patrol people. This is odd considering all of the "non-productive" firefighters were to be put on the street to patrol.

The city would have been further ahead by maintaining separate departments but streamlining them. This fact is supported by a statistic that was presented by then finance director for Kalamazoo Keith Overly. At a public hearing regarding Reducing the Costs of Government Services, he pointed out that prior to consolidation, total costs for police and fire services were 57.4% of the general fund budget. After consolidation costs climbed to a high of 64.7% in 1990. The 1999 figure is appears to be 56.4%.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Post Public Safety

The Return to Separate Police and Fire Departments

After examining the Public Safety Committee's Proposal over and over again, it becomes quite clear that changes and cuts were being made before it even got off the ground. Many promises were made to the citizens, but crucial ones were not kept. Specifically reducing services by closing Station #1, moving out of Station #7 (airport station), and never building a ninth station. A lot of consultants were hired to give their opinions. Bits and pieces of the consultant's recommendations were taken and implemented, and most of those were cuts that affected the level of fire protection substantially.

Also fire apparatus was cut in half. The proposal called for 10 engine companies and now there are only 5, reducing coverage and increasing response times dramatically. Also the wear and tear on apparatus, that now have to pick up the calls for service of the stations that were closed, has increased dramatically.

Also currently there is no fire training at all. I have not received fire training in over 2 years. There is also limited police training. Training is one of the most important components in public safety, as was identified by the Committee and other public safety departments.

There were to be 32 officers on the street 24 hours a day 7 days a week. This never became reality. Today the average is 20 or 21, or maybe a few more on a given day.

If the program would have been implemented as proposed, it would have had a chance of working well and being successful. It was not implemented. The public safety concept has failed in my opinion.

The City of Kalamazoo should immediately begin the process for returning to separate police and fire departments. The outcome will be the professionalization of both careers again. You just simply cannot be excellent or even good by doing both careers. There is not enough time in the day to become great in performing both functions. If the goal is just to have an average, at best, delivery of both police and fire services, then public safety should remain in place. The dichotomy of the two professions is simply too great. Instead, the two separate departments should be progressive, aggressive, streamlined and very functional organizations, with the outcome being the providing of high quality police and fire services.

The separation of departments has a potential annual savings of almost \$2.0 million.

The "New" Kalamazoo Fire Department

The new Kalamazoo Fire Department will be very functional and streamlined. There will be no multiple divisions or units. The organization will focus on the fire suppression function, and all personnel will be involved in such with the exception of

the 2 fire marshals, the training lieutenant and training firefighter(see Appendix F). All of these personnel can be utilized for suppression during their normal duty hours.

The department will operate on the 3-platoon 24-hour shift, 56-hour work week. This system allows for the most minimal number of employees required. The National Fire Protection Association states that it requires 1.875 firefighters per 1000 population to give the equivalent of .5 firefighters on duty per shift. In Kalamazoo's case this would equate to 150 firefighters. There will rarely be personnel called in on overtime, specifically if one-half of the apparatus is allowed to drop down to 3 fire personnel, or 4 personnel on time off per shift. If a command officer is off, the senior firefighter would assume the role of lieutenant, lieutenant to captain, and captain to battalion chief.

Each shift would be supervised by 2 battalion chiefs. One would work north and the other south. This would accomplish several things. Firstly, it is the optimum for supervision. The NFPA standards recommend that a battalion chief supervise no more than 4 stations. Each chief would supervise 3 initially. This way you could have two residential fire incidents simultaneously and have a chief officer at each incident. Also if you had a major fire this would give you 2 chief officers at the scene, which is a necessity.

Secondly, these battalion chiefs would be functional chiefs. Not only would they supervise the daily fire suppression function, but they would also be assigned a specific function such as equipment maintenance, apparatus maintenance, hazmat/right-to-know/technical rescue, EMS, fire prevention/education, and building

maintenance. Each would be responsible for those items and would be expected to handle problems as they arise. This eliminates any need for "service division" type civilian employees.

Initially the department will continue to operate out of the existing fire stations. There are 5 engine companies, 2 ladder companies and 1 heavy rescue squad. Each of these apparatus will have 4 people assigned to it per shift. There will be 3 firefighters and 1 lieutenant on each truck, except the stations that have multiple trucks, where one truck would have a captain on it. This will be in compliance to the OSHA Rule of 1997 called "2 in/2 out". The rule is a firefighter safety rule, and it requires that before any interior firefighting can begin, there has to be 4 firefighters at the scene, with 2 going interior to fight fire, and the other 2 outside, prepared to go inside in case of a problem, and they must be in visual or voice contact the whole time. The only exception to the rule is if a "known" rescue situation is present.

The City should begin to make accommodations and remodel old Station #1 so that an engine and heavy rescue squad can be operated out of there. It would be my recommendation to close Station #4 on Rose Street, because Station #5 on Douglas and #3 on Gull at Riverview are within 2 minutes of #4, and the overlap is not necessary, even if that area does have a heavy fire load because of old housing and old commercial buildings. Stations 3 and 5 can more than adequately cover that area, and with Station #1 being reopened, the response would be just that much better.

Truck 4 from Rose St could be placed at #3 and personnel assigned there.

Future plans should include building of a station in the Drake Road/ West Michigan area. This area would protect the college area, as well as numerous apartment complexes and mobile home parks, and the future Arcadia development. The response times from Stations 6 and 5 are much too long not just for fires, but EMS calls as well. This area is going to be developed, and calls for service will increase substantially, therefore placing more wear and tear on apparatus.

Plans should be made to either move back into the airport station, or build a station in the Cork/Portage area to service the southeastern part of the city which includes the Milwood neighborhood. Currently that area is served by the station on Bryant Street. This makes for very long response times.

Calls for fire and emergency medical services have gone way up over the past 10 years. In 1989, total calls for fire and EMS were at a low of 3234. In 1994, that had risen to 4400. In 1998, the total now had reached 6657, which is an all time high. This equates to an increase in fire and EMS calls in 5 years by 50%. Even a bigger reason to build stations in unprotected areas and re-open station #1.

No data can be compiled for apparatus response times because once they are dispatched, when the first arriving PSO unit advises it is on the scene, all apparatus are placed on the scene. Individual apparatus are not tracked.

The addition of 2 stations will of course necessitate adding 24 positions to the department, but with the cost savings in reduced wages, this could be easily accomplished without depleting the amount saved.

The "New" Kalamazoo Police Department

The overall look of the new police department will not be much different than what it is today(see Appendix H). The main changes are that there will initially be 2 less detectives, 2 less investigators in KVET, the 2 traffic statistician and accident investigator positions will be changed to civilian positions, 2 less NLO's, and the crime prevention officer position can be eliminated and the function assigned to the NLO sergeant. This will have the potential savings of \$292,000.

Also the TRU unit should be eliminated. This unit was established in 1990 to deal with the heavy crack dealing on the streets. The mission of this unit has been completed, and now it is time to reassign those officers where they can be more productive in street patrol and fire suppression. If necessary, when there is a problem that arises and needs to be targeted, a tactical unit could be assembled on an overtime basis. Even if you had to assign 4 officers for 16 hours per week on overtime, the costs would be \$125,000, as compared to \$220,000 for TRU plus 1 sergeant at \$62,000 for a total of about \$282,000. The savings would be \$157,000 annually.

Street patrol will still be operated the same way. Officers, sergeants and lieutenants will work the 12-hour shift, on a 4 platoon system. There will be 2 lieutenants on days and 2 on nights. They will work on opposite platoons, so there will only be overlap every other Monday and no lieutenant the opposite Mondays.

There will be 2 sergeants on each platoon, except the 2 platoons that do not have lieutenants. Those platoons will have 3 sergeants. This will be the case on both

shifts. There will always be at least 4 sergeants scheduled to work. The supervision to officer ratio would be 1 to 4.

There will be 8 patrol officers on each platoon plus 2 downtown beat officers during the day and 1 at night. With 2 platoons always working, there will be a potential for 16 patrol officers. Combined with a maximum of 5 sergeants, the potential street strength would be 20 or 21. The shift could be allowed to drop down to 14 officers/sergeants. The officers would have more time available as they would not have to respond to fire and rescue calls anymore. A rescue call takes at least 30 minutes out of the duty shift. So this means that a minimum of 14 total officers and command officers would be on- duty per shift, which is what the minimum is today in public safety. If 14 PSO's can handle police and fire duties, then 14 patrol officers and sergeants can handle police calls only.

The significant difference would be that sergeants would now be handling calls for service. Currently sergeants do not respond to calls on a regular basis and do not write reports. The premise here is that they must stay available for fire calls. With that function eliminated, they now could take calls for service. They could handle the nuisance calls like barking dogs, excessive noise, trouble with a subject, and so forth. That way they could remain available to assist the officers on major crimes.

Also certain calls for service should be eliminated such as refused reports of barking dogs, refused reports of loud music, had trouble with a subject who now is gone, and so forth. Officers' time is valuable and it is not necessary to bog them

down with calls where callers are not willing to make a complaint. This ties them up when they should be taking more pertinent calls and patrolling for crime.

In the event that no sergeants are scheduled to work, the senior officer could become an "acting" sergeant. This is done in a lot of traditional police departments, and it gives officers the chance to train in supervision and increases their morale. This would also avoid having to call in overtime. The same would be true when a lieutenant is gone and a sergeant fills in.

Cost Savings

The potential cost savings as I mentioned before would be close to \$2.0 million. This of course uses the data that all personnel would be paid at a 10% lower rate. The cost savings would have to be long term.

There are currently 4 captains, 5 lieutenants and 11 sergeants with 20 or more years of service on the department. My recommendation would be to "buy out" these command officers just like they did during the merger 16 years ago. You could then promote new people into the lower salary rate, saving money right away. There would be no cost to the city to buy out people, as it only affects the pension fund, which is in excellent shape.

The same would apply for the sworn officers. There are 33 officers with 20 or more years of service. These officers should also be bought out. If they accept the buy out, there would be a huge savings for the city up front. Assuming that 33 officers are earning \$55,000, the annual cost is \$1,815,000. Hiring new officers and

firefighters at a lower rate of \$30,000 would cost \$990,000. The total net savings to the city would be \$825,000 in the first year. This does not even include the savings in benefits, which could be another \$288,750 savings. This could bring the total savings in the first year alone to \$1,113,750.

Another area for savings is the dispatch center. Currently the cost for dispatchers is approximately \$900,000 annually. If the county were to consolidate dispatch centers into one central dispatching point as proposed, this cost could possibly be eliminated, assuming the cost could be covered in some other manner, such as a phone surcharge. This idea has been presented to the Council of Governments(COG), and is currently being discussed and examined.

Further savings could be realized if jail facilities were combined. If the city and county jails were to be combined, there could be a possible savings of another \$450,000 annually. This is an idea that has been previously brought up.

Centralizing records is another area where costs could be saved. This too has been brought up in discussions before, and has a potential savings for the city of approximately \$100,000 annually.

There would also be a savings in cruiser costs. The amount of cruisers could probably be reduced by 25%, saving about \$154,000 annually on 7 cruisers.

Another area of savings would be the air packs that are currently bid out to be replaced. The total number of air packs to be replaced is 89, at an approximate cost of \$2200 each for a total of \$195,800. If you were to have 8 pieces of apparatus initially, each one would need 6 air packs, for a total of 48. The total cost to replace

the air packs would then only be \$105,600 for savings of \$90,200. You would then eliminate the need for air packs in cruisers. This would also result in the savings of yearly maintenance costs of about \$4000.

Costs could also be eliminated for protective clothing for firefighting. Turn out gear should be replaced on a scheduled basis every 5 years. The cost of a set of turn out gear is \$1000. Currently you have 260 people that need turnout gear. That means every year the department should be replacing 52 sets at a cost of \$52,000. In the new fire department, there would only be 108 people, so the annual costs would be \$21,000, or less than half.

More savings could be realized with the civilianization of the positions of 4 mobile lab techs and 2 lab specialists(like they have in Grand Rapids), the traffic statistician, and traffic coordinator. Total cost savings here could be approximately \$120,000.


Appendix D and E show the cost for wages for a fire department and police department, assuming the existing department was proportionally split in two and the firefighters and police officers were paid 10% less than what they are currently paid, along with proportional deductions for supervisors and administrators. The possible savings would be \$1,831,068.

These are just a few areas besides wages where the city could realize savings by going back to separate departments. A more comprehensive study should be done by financial experts, who could give a much more detailed report of cost savings.

Appendix A

The Public Safety Committees Proposed Public Safety Department

PUBLIC SAFETY OPERATIONS DIVISION:



277 Positions
269 Sworn
8 Civilian

*Totals reflect Equipment Operator positions multiplied by 3 shifts and patrol multiplied by 4.

Appendix B

Firefighter and Police Officer Wage Comparison

WAGE COMPARISON

DEPARTMENT	FIREFIGHTER	POLICE OFFICER
Farmington Hills	Start: 29,471 Top: 47,114	Start: 31,843 Top: 48,637
Pontiac	Start: 29,956 Top: 35,688	Start: 31,757 Top: 41,089
Royal Oak	Start: 32,371 Top: 46,241	Start: 32,783 Top: 46,241
Canton Twp	Start: 31,483 Top: 50,004	Start: 29,423 Top: 47,347
Dearborn	Start: 30,807 Top: 47,953	Start: 32,588 Top: 46,056
Livonia	Start: 30,139 Top: 42,660	Start: 35,318 Top: 47,091
Westland	Start: 31,950 Top: 45,643	Start: 32,699 Top: 46, 714
Sterling Heights	Start: 30,663 Top: 49,075	Start: 31,757 Top: 50,939
Grand Rapids	Start: 28,102 Top: 42,933	Start: 32, 856 Top: 46,501
Wyoming	Start: 34,411 Top: 42,274	Start: 35,131 Top: 42,182
Lansing	Start: 29,211 Top: 42,428	Start: 29,357 Top: 42,240

Saginaw	Start: 26,091 Top: 40,389	Start: 34,000 Top: 40,389
Portage	Start: 30,219 Top: 46,550	Start: 31,932 Top: 47,171
Kalamazoo Co. Sheriff	N/A	Start: 33,934 Top: 48,194

Average Start: 30,606	Average Start: 32,626
Average Top: 44,824	Average Top: 46,371

KDPS	Start: 40,448 Top: 54,775	S/A
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KDPS has a 32% higher starting wage than the average fire department and 24% higher than average police department

KDPS also has 22% higher top wage than the average fire department and 18% higher than the average police department

Appendix C
Current Public Safety Wages

ASSIGNMENT**TOTAL WAGES**

92 Street PSO's	
65% @ top pay for 60 total @ \$54,775	\$3,286,500
35% @ 6yr start ave. for 32 total @ \$45,908	1,469,056
Sub Total	4,755,556
 4 Radar Officers @ \$54,775	 219,100
Sub Total	219,100
 4 Jailers @ \$54,775	 219,100
1 Court Officer @ \$54,775	54,775
Sub Total	273,875
 2 Fire Marshals @ \$56,701	 113,402
Sub Total	113,402
 4 Mobile Lab Techs @ \$57,396	 229,584
2 Lab Specialists @ \$59,536	119,072
Sub Total	348,656
 2 Training Division PSO's @ \$54,775	 109,550
Sub Total	109,550
 10 NLO's @ \$54,775	 547,750
Sub Total	547,750
 1 Crime Prevention PSO @ \$54,775	 54,775
Sub Total	54,775
 12 KVET PSO's @ \$54,775	 657,300
Sub Total	657,300
 22 Detectives @ \$57,396	 1,262,712
1 Polygraph Examiner @ \$59,536	59,536
Sub Total	1,322,248
 2 Traffic Officers @ \$54,775	 109,550
2 Tele-Serve Officers @ \$54,775	109,550
Sub Total	219,100

4	TRU PSO's @ \$54,775	219,100
	Sub Total	219,100
30	PSO/EO's @ \$52,358	1,570,740
	Sub Total	1,570,740
9	IAFF Firefighters @ (\$49,582)	446,238
	Sub Total	446,238
	TOTAL	\$10,857,390

BENEFITS @ 35% of \$10,857,390	3,800,087
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TOTAL WAGES AND BENEFITS FOR SWORN OFFICERS	<u>\$14,657,477</u>
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COMMAND OFFICERS**TOTAL WAGES**

4	Captains @ \$73,299	293,196
11	Lieutenants @ \$68,709	755,799
37	Sergeants @ \$61,348	2,269,876
	Sub Total	\$3,318,871

ADMINISTRATION

1	Chief @ \$90,000	90,000
1	Assistant Chief @ \$86,000	86,000
1	Deputy Chief @ \$86,000	86,000
1	Inspector @ \$80,000	80,000
	Sub Total	\$342,000

TOTAL	\$3,660,871
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BENEFITS @ 35% of \$3,660,871	\$1,281,305
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TOTAL WAGES AND BENEFITS FOR COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION	\$4,942,176
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TOTAL WAGES AND BENEFITS FOR ALL OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT	<u>\$19,599,653</u>
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Appendix D
Proposed Fire Department Wages

PROPOSED FIRE DEPARTMENT

POSITION	WAGES
1 Fire Chief @ \$68,330	68,330
1 Assistant Chief @ \$62,118	62,118
2 Fire Marshals @ \$52,531	105,062
1 Training Lieutenant @ \$51,250	51,250
1 Training Firefighter @ \$50,000	50,000
6 Battalion Chiefs @ \$56,471	338,826
6 Captains @ \$52,531	315,186
18 Lieutenants @ \$51,250	922,500
72 Firefighters	
65% or 47 at top pay @ \$50,000	2,350,000
35% or 25 at 6yr start ave @ \$38,333	958,325
TOTAL	\$5,221,597
BENEFITS @ 35% of \$5,221,597	1,827,559
TOTAL WAGES AND BENEFITS	<u>\$7,049,156</u>

Appendix E
Proposed Police Department Wages

PROPOSED POLICE DEPARTMENT

POSITION

WAGES

Administration

1	Chief @ \$68,330	68,330
1	Assistant Chief @ \$62,118	62,118
2	Captains @ \$56,471	112,942
	Sub Total	\$243,390

Operations/Training

1	Training Sergeant @ \$51,250	51,250
4	Radar Officers @ \$50,000	200,000
8	NLO's @ \$50,000	400,000
4	Lieutenants @ \$52,531	210,124
20	Patrol Sergeants @ \$51,250	1,025,000
70	Patrol Officers	
	65% or 46 at top pay @ \$50,000	2,300,000
	35% or 24 at 6 yr start ave. @ \$38,333	919,992
	2 Tele-Serve Officers @ \$50,000	\$100,000
	Sub Total	\$5,206,366

Criminal Inv./Service

CID

1	CID Lieutenant @ \$52,531	52,531
2	CID Sergeants @ \$51,250	102,500
20	Detectives @ \$51,000	1,020,000
1	Polygraph Examiner @ \$51,250	51,250
	Sub Total	\$1,226,281

KVET

3	Sergeants @ \$51,250	153,750
10	Investigators @ \$50,000	500,000
	Sub Total	\$653,750

Service

1	Lieutenant @ \$52,531	52,531
4	Mobile Lab Technicians @ \$51,000	204,000
2	Lab Specialists @ \$52,000	104,000
4	Jailers @ \$50,000	200,000
1	Court Officer @ \$50,000	50,000
	Sub Total	610,531


TOTAL	\$7,940,318
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BENEFITS @ 35% of \$2,779,111	\$2,779,111
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TOTAL WAGES AND BENEFITS	\$10,719,429
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Appendix F
Proposed "Initial" Fire Department


PROPOSED "INITIAL" KALAMAZOO FIRE DEPARTMENT



Appendix G


Proposed "Final" Fire Department

PROPOSED "FINAL" KALAMAZOO FIRE DEPARTMENT




Appendix H
Proposed Police Department

PROPOSED KALAMAZOO POLICE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS/TRAINING DIVISION



PROPOSED KALAMAZOO POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS/SERVICE DIVISIONS



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